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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury case

resul~in~

from a

rear-end collision involving vehicles driven by the

p~rties.

Plaintiff and Appellant, Sharon Collier, sustained severe
physical injuries.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In November, 1979, a jury in Uintah County returned
a verdict of no cause of action against Mrs. Collier. Her
motion for a new trial was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Sharon Collier, seeks a reversal of the
judgment of the lower court and a new trial on all issues.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 9, 1976, Defendant struck the rear of
Mrs. Collier's vehicle at a point 1.7 miles south of Vernal
on Vernal Avenue. The road was snow-packed and slippery
and it was dark and there were no street lights. Mrs. Collier was driving a Datsun Pickup and her tail lights were
on and working properly. In addition, the pickup had a camper shell on it with clearance lights which were also on
and working properly.
Because of the deep snow conditions,

~rs.

Collier's

vehicle had been towed from her driveway onto the road by
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her husband. She was traveling at about 10 mph on the snowpacked road and had been on the road long enough to observe
Defendant approaching from about 500 yards back.
Defendant was approaching at about 35 mph and, just
before the collision, he applied his brakes, skidded sideways and collided with Mrs. Collier's vehicle at a speed
of about 20 mph. He testified that he did not see her until
he reached a point about 75 feet from impact.
As a consequence of this accident, Mrs. Collier
has sustained physical injuries, the effects of which continue to the present time. The medical expenses and other
special damages exceed $3,500.00.
ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
sets forth the grounds for grantfng a new trial as follows:
Rule 59(a) Grounds.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing
to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the verdict or other decision, or that it is
against the law.
(7) Error in law.
In Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 P.2d 722
(1958), a case with several similarities to this case, this
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Court

~eviewed

the facts

~fter

the jury returned

A

of no cause of action. It was determined that there

verdict
w~s

ample evidence to support a verdict for the Plaintiff and
that it did not support the verdict rendered. The Court
concluded that a new trial was proper. In this case

appe~l

by Mrs. Collier, there is also ample evidence that Defendant
was negligent, and none to show that he acted reasonably
under the circumstances.

POINT I
IT IS NEGLIGENCE FOR A DRIVER OF A MOTOR VEHICLE TO
FAIL TO KNOW THAT THE ROADWAY AHEAD IS CLEAR AND SAFE
FOR HIM TO TRAVEL AT THE SPEED WHICH HE IS MAINTAINING.
Common sense alone tells us that it would be negligence for a driver of a motor vehicle to proceed on a public
roadway without knowing whether there are any obstacles
in his path. It is further obvious to a reasonable person
that it would be negligence to proceed, knowing that an
obstacle is or may be in the roadway, without assuring onesself that he has the capability of stopping before hitting
the obstacle.
In the recent case of Keller v. Shelley, 551 P.2d
513 (1976), this Court said:
It has been the law of this state ever since
Dalle v. Mid-Western Dair Products Co.: that
an it is ne~ igence as a matter o
aw for
a person torive an automobile upon a trav7led
public highway used by vehicles and pedestrians,
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at such a rate of speed that said vehicle cannot
be stopped within the distance at which the
operator of said car is able to see objects
upon the highway in front of him. (Emphasis
added.)
See also, Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 15 P.2d
309 (Utah 1932), which adopted the above language and legal
doctrine.
In Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah 1975),
the Defendant was distracted by a vehicle approaching the
street from a driveway. Upon looking back to the street
ahead, he found that he was too close to Plaintiff's car,
which was stopped for a traffic signal, to avoid a collision. The court's decision reflected the obvious when it
said:
It is the duty of a driver of a motor vehicle
to see or to know, from having seen, that the
highway ahead of him is clear.and safe for him
to travel at the speed which he is maintaining,
and it is ne~ligence for him to fail to do so.
(Emphasis ad ed.)
Although the court found unusual circumstances in
Bullock v. Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975), it stated
that:
... In most cases where our car 'rear-ends' another it accords with common sense and ex erience to e ieve t at t e o owing car as isregarded the duty to keep a lookout ahead and
keep the car under control and is, therefore,
at fault. (Emphasis added.)
In that case, the driver of the lead vehicle was driving
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erratically and the jury returned a

verd~ct

of no cause

of action in favor of the driver of the followinc car. This
Court decreed that circumstances May alter the

deter~ination

that the following car had disregarded its duty of

c~re

and said, "In order to make that determination, it is our
duty to review the evidence under the assumption that the
jury believed those aspects of it which support their verdict." Id. P. 191.
Such would be the duty of this Court in this case.
Here the jury found contrary to "common sen.se and experience." It is necessary to determine whether the evidence
supports that finding. Appellant contends that it does not,
not because such evidence is weak, but because it is virtually non-existent. This is brought out more fully in Point
II of this brief. It is "negligence as a matter of law"
to drive at such a rate of speed that a vehicle cannot be
stopped in time to avoid hitting objects within the sight
of the driver, then the evidence in this case required a
finding in favor of

~rs.

Collier. There was no clear and

direct evidence that this case would fall in the category
of exceptions contemplated by Bullock, Supra. The only evidence of negligence adduced related to that of the Defendant.

-5-
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POINT II
THE EVIDENCE DID NOT SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT.
The trial court determined that Mrs. Collier was
not negligent and said:
the Court has now concluded as a matter
of law that Plaintiff, Sharon Collier, was not
negligent in driving her vehicle.(Tr. 140-41,
L. 29 to L.l.)
In light of the evidence presented in the trial, that conclusion was proper.
In consequence of the above, the cause of the action
could only be attributed to the negligence of the Defendant,
or to an Act of God. The latter alternative has never been
claimed, intimated or argued. The facts would not justify
it. The evidence, however, clearly demonstrates the negligence of the Defendant. On the evening of the accident, the
conditions were described as "dark, no street lights, snowy,
slippery and cloudy" (Tr., P.25, L.32, P.26, L.l) by the
investigating officer, a situation that would require more
than normal caution. These conditions were verified by the
t~stimony

of the Defendant:

"Q.

. . . Do you have any dispute about this
road being snow-packed?

A. It was snow-packed.

Q. It was snow-packed?
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A. (the witness nodded his head.)" (Tr. P. ~1.
Ll. 10-14.)
And further:

"Q. It (the snow) was all packed down. Was it
slippery?

A. Yes . " (Tr. , P. 81 , L1 . 21- 2 2 . )

also:

"Q. And you had been traveling. well, even back
beyond 2500 South when you had been on a
slippery surface that whole way.
A. Yes.

Q. Had you applied your brakes at any other
place?

A. Yes. When I was going out there, I'd stop
at signs and stuff.

Q. So you knew it was slick?
A. Well, I didn't spin out or nothing. I just
made it----" (Tr., P.86, LL 119-28.)
The Plaintiff also testified that the road was "very
slick," (Tr., P.40, LL 17-18,) and snow-packed, (Tr., P.40,
Ll. 11-13.) Plaintiff's husband confirmed the condition
of the road as brought out by the testimony of the police
officer and the parties, (Tr., P.102, Ll. 3-10.)
Under such conditions it is obvious that the Defendant should have been maintaining a high standard of care
to allow him to guard against possible danger. He should
not only have been driving at a reduced speed, but should
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also have been keeping an extra cautious lookout. Testimony
demonstrate that he was doing neither.
The accident was determined by the investigating
officer to have been caused by the Defendant, with no contributing cause on the part of Plaintiff. {Tr., Pp. 28-29)
In fact, the Defendant was described as driving "too fast"
(Tr., P.29, L. 13) and keeping an "improper lookout" (Tr.,
P.29, L.15).
Defendant admitted both to the investigating officer
at the scene (Tr., P.31, LL 2-3) and in testimony at court
that he was traveling at a speed of 35 mph for some time
preceeding the accident. (Tr., P.85, Ll. 2-13.) With the
road conditions as described, reason alone would question
whether 35 mph was a safe speed to maintain. However, those
who saw him approaching were immediately aware that he
seemed to be driving "quite fast," {Tr., P.92, LL 21-22),
"faster than I would drive in a car on that type of conditions." {Tr., P.103, Ll. 2-3.) There seems to have been
ample grounds for Defendant's being cited by the investigating officer for driving too fast. Although the testimony
is in accord with the proposition that the Defendant was
driving too fast, the physical evidence is simple but overwhelming in showing negligence in the speed he was maintaining. Concerning this, the Defendant's testimony was as follows:

-8-
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"Q. But you did when you got to this point say
you observed at least her tail lights. (IndLcating) What did you do?
A. I hit the brakes, and I put one hand on the
horn. And she knew I was coming. And the car
slid sideways, and I kind of str3ightened--rt'
out, but it just keot going, and then stopped
at the impact. (Emphasis added.) (Tr., P.85,
Ll. 25-30.)
Obviously, Defendant was going so fast that he did not have
control of his vehicle when he became aware of a hazard
in the roadway ahead.
Furthermore, the record is replete with testimony
that the Defendant was maintaining an improper lookout.
From the evidence at the scene, the investigating officer
so concluded. (Tr., P.29, L.15.) The Defendant testified
that he was about 75 feet from the Plaintiff's car before
he saw her, (Tr., P.82, Ll. 4-1,) that is, he had passed
Plaintiff's husband who was stopped, waiting to turn into
his driveway. The accident was measured to have occurred
76 feet past the driveway. (Tr., P.27, Ll. 4-8.) Under ideal
road conditions, Defendant might have been able to stop
within that distance upon discovering a hazard. Under snowy,
slippery conditions it was impossible. Plaintiff had observed Defendant approaching for some 500 yards. (Tr., P.42,
Ll. 7-9.) Defendant testified that Plaintiff's car had tail
lights and that he saw them {Tr., P.82, Ll. 15-20). Plaintiff's husband testified that not only were there tail

-9-
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lights on Plaintiff's Pickup, but it also had three or four
lights across the top of the camper shell. (Tr., P.96, Ll.
10-25.) In spite of this testimony which showed that Plaintiff's car was clearly visible, and that the view was unobstructed for at least 500 yards when Plaintiff first saw
Defendant, Defendant still did not see Plaintiff in time
to avoid a collision.
Not only does the evidence show that Defendant was
traveling at a speed which prevented him from stopping to
avoid collision with a vehicle properly on the roadway,
but he traveled almost 500 yards after it became visible
to him before he actually saw it. By that time his excessive
speed made it impossible to stop in time to avoid the accident. Under existing Utah law, there was clearly an adQquate
showing that Defendant was negligent and a verdict to the
contrary is both against the evidence and against the law.
CONCLUSION
It is conceded that there may be instances where
a rear-end collision could result from circumstances other
than the negligence of the following driver. The Bullock
case, supra, is such a case where the lead car was driven
erratically, making unexpected stops and starts.
In this case, however, Mrs. Collier was doing noth-
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ing thAt a reasonable driver wouldn't do under the circumstances. The defendant was cited for driving "too fast" and
keeping an "improper lookout." 'Jhen he saw '-\rs. Collier's
vehicle he was not able to stop in time to avoid hitting
her. Since 1932, when Dallev, supra, was decided. that has
been negligence as a matter of law.
A verdict of no cause of action is clearly contrary
to the law. The consequent failure to award any damage in
light of the overwhelming evidence of negligence and the
undisputed evidence of damages can only be explained in
terms of passion or prejudice.
The judgment on the verdict in this case should
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
DATED this 7th day of April, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHMAN & WRIGHT
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copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to: JOHN M.
CHIPMAN, Attorney for Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid on this 7th. day of
April, 1980.
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